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Determining Arbitrability of the
Dispute: The Clear and Unmistakable
Standard for Choice of Law in
Arbitration Agreements
Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, the Ninth Circuit addressed the is-
sue of whether or not parties may contract to apply non-federal arbitrability law in
an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the contract.2 The Ninth Circuit's
decision also discusses the issue of whether or not choice of law provisions con-
tained within arbitration clauses are dispositive of the choice of law to be applied
in determining arbitrability, and additionally, sets forth a standard to be used in
determining arbitrability.3 After examining Supreme Court precedent in which
the court has recognized the viability of non-federal rules of arbitration contained
within a contract, this note will explore additional federal precedent related to the
interpretation of choice of law clauses as applied to arbitrability. The various
federal circuit court interpretations of the scope of arbitration clauses will be ad-
dressed because the scope of the clause may be governed by federal arbitrability
law if the parties have not sufficiently contracted to apply non-federal arbitrability
law.
This note will also address the "clear and unmistakable" standard adopted by
the Ninth Circuit and used to determine whether or not parties have agreed to
apply non-federal arbitrability law.4 Based on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, this Note concludes that the court properly
extracted a standard normally used to determine whether a court decides arbitra-
bility as applicable to determining whether parties have sufficiently contracted for
non-federal arbitrability law. Lastly, this Note will address the interpretation of
arbitration clauses under federal law.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On February 2, 2005, Cape Flattery, a motor vessel, became grounded along a
coral reef in Oahu, Hawaii. As a result of the vessel running aground, the U.S.
Coast Guard delivered a Notice of Federal Interest to Cape Flattery Limited and
1. Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2011).
2. Id. Non-federal arbitrability law refers to state or foreign rules of arbitration.
3. Id.
4. Id
5. Id at 916.
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ordered the Unified Command to alleviate the risk of an oil spill from the vessel.
Immediately following the Notice and Order, 33 U.S.C. § 2702 required Cape
Flattery Limited ("Cape Flattery"), the owner of the motor vessel, to pay for and
begin removal of the ship from the coral reef.8 Cape Flattery executed an agree-
ment with Titan Maritime, LLC ("Titan Maritime") to act reasonably in removing
the vessel from Barbers Point and to deliver the vessel back to Cape Flattery.9
The agreement also included an arbitration clause requiring that "any dispute aris-
ing under" the agreement would be settled in London, England under the English
Arbitration Act of 1996.1' The agreement did not specifically state whether Eng-
lish law also applied in determining the scope of the arbitration clause."
Upon execution of the agreement, Titan Maritime removed the ship from the
coral reef.12 Although an oil discharge did not occur, at some point during the
vessel's grounding or removal the submerged coral reef became severely dam-
aged.13 Consequently, the United States government informed Cape Flattery of its
liability under 33 U.S.C. § 2702 for damages to the reef resulting from the ship's
grounding.14  On August 8, 2008, the United States government estimated that
Cape Flattery would be liable for damages greater than $15 million.'s Two
months later on October 24, 2008, Cape Flattery brought an action against Titan
Maritime in federal district court for the District of Hawaii. Cape Flattery
sought indemnity and contribution under 33 U.S.C. § 2709 for the alleged damage
Titan Maritime caused in removing the vessel. '7 Cape Flattery also alleged that
Titan Maritime caused the damage as a result of gross negligence and further
sought to prevent Titan Maritime from compelling arbitration. In response to
Cape Flattery's complaint, Titan Maritime filed a motion to compel arbitration
6. The Unified Command is a group that is established under the United States government. The
Unified Command brings together each Incident Commander of all possible groups involved in han-
dling incidents, including both governmental and non-governmental organizations. See What is a
Unified Command, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/what is uc.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2013).
7. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 916.
8. Cape Flattery Ltd, 647 F.3d at 916; 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012). Section 2702, any party who is
responsible for a vessel that may discharge oil into navigable waters is liable if there is a substantial
threat of oil discharge. 33 U.S.C. § 2702.
9. Cape Flattery Ltd, 647 F.3d at 916. Cape Flattery Limited is the company that owns the motor





14. Cape Flattery Ltd, 647 F.3d at 916; 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). Under section 2702, if a vessel has
harmed or destroyed natural resources in navigable waters, the owner of the vessel is liable for damag-
es. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
15. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 916.
16. Id.
17. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 916-17; 33 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012). Section 2709 allows a liable
party to bring a civil action for contribution against any other party who also may be liable under the
statute. 33 U.S.C. § 2709.
18. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 917. Cape Flattery alleged that Titan Maritime acted grossly
negligent by using an improper type of tow line that damaged the coral reef. Cape Flattery Ltd. v.
Titan Mar. LLC, No. 08-00482, 2012 WL 3113168 *1 (D. Haw. July 31, 2012). Cape Flattery further
alleged that Titan Maritime knew that the heavy tow line would cause damage to the reef. Id.
252 [Vol. 2013
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pursuant to the towing agreement's arbitration clause.19 The district court denied
the motion and refused to compel arbitration. 20
In denying the motion to compel arbitration, the district court stated that Eng-
lish law did not govern the arbitrability of the dispute; rather, federal arbitrability
law governed in determining the scope of the arbitration clause. 21 The court ex-
pressed doubt as to whether federal arbitrability law permitted parties to for non-
federal arbitrability law, even though Cape Flattery and Titan Maritime agreed to
arbitrate disputes under English law.22 The district court ultimately found that the
dispute over the damages to the coral reef did not come within the scope of the
arbitration agreement, applying a narrow construction of the agreement's lan-
guage.23 Because Titan Maritime had a duty to remove the grounded vessel with-
out damaging the coral reef under federal law, and that distinct duty fell outside of
the scope of the arbitration agreement entered into with Cape Flattery, the district
court did not find the tort claim arbitrable. 24
Titan Maritime appealed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.25 While Cape Flattery contended that
federal arbitrability law always applied to determine the arbitrability of the dis-
pute, Titan Maritime contended that federal arbitrability law mandated that the
terms of the parties' agreement be enforced, especially when the parties agreed to
apply non-federal arbitrability law. 2 6 Titan Maritime also maintained that if fed-
eral arbitrability law applied, the "any dispute arising under" portion of the arbi-
tration clause entered into with Cape Flattery should be construed broadly to
maintain the presumption in favor of arbitration.27
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and held that when par-
ties enter into a written contract under which arbitrability will be governed by
non-federal arbitrability law, courts should enforce the agreement as written only
if there is "clear and unmistakable evidence" the contracting parties intended to
use non-federal arbitrability law.28  Because the agreement entered into between
Cape Flattery and Titan Maritime established that English arbitration law applied
but did not present "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the parties also intend-
ed to use English arbitrability law, federal arbitrability law applied. 29 The court,
applying federal arbitrability law, construed the agreement's "any dispute arising
19. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 917.
20. Id. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration after a hearing and after taking
several briefs from the parties. Id.
21. Id (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (hold-
ing that federal arbitrability law applied even though the parties' agreement stated that Japanese arbi-
tration law governed the dispute's arbitrability)).
22. Id. The court also noted that even if the parties could contract out of federal arbitrability law,
Cape Flattery and Titan Maritime had not successfully contracted out of that law. Id.
23. Id. (citing Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Constr. Co., 708 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.
1983); Tracer Research Corp. v. Nat'l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1994)).
24. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 917.
25. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 917; 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2012). Section 16 allows a
party to appeal the denial of its motion to compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 16.
26. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 918-19. Titan Maritime implicitly argued that the English choice
of law clause applied to the scope of the arbitration clause. Id. at 921.
27. Id at 922.
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under" arbitration clause narrowly and not include the tort claim brought by Cape
Flattery.30
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the decision in Cape Flattery, neither the United States Supreme
Court nor the Ninth Circuit had decided whether federal arbitrability law permits
parties entering into an arbitration agreement to agree to use foreign arbitrability
law. 31 Likewise, neither court had stated how to determine whether parties had
sufficiently contracted to apply foreign arbitrability law. This section will address
the Supreme Court's recognition of agreements to arbitrate under state rules and
the decisions in which federal circuits have recognized arbitration agreements
applying state or foreign arbitrability law. This section will also address two Su-
preme Court decisions, Kaplan and Mastrobuono, which may point to the reason-
ing that the Supreme Court would apply in determining whether or not parties
have contracted to apply non-federal arbitrability law. Finally, this section will
address the interpretation of arbitration clauses, including the narrow interpreta-
tion adopted by the Ninth Circuit and the broad interpretation adopted by several
other federal circuits.
A. Arbitration Agreements Enforced Containing State or Foreign Choice
ofLaw Provisions
The Supreme Court has recognized the ability of parties to contract for appli-
cation of state rules of arbitration and federal circuit courts have recognized the
ability of parties to contract for application of both state and foreign rules of arbi-
tration. In Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,32 the
Supreme Court held that parties may contract for state arbitration rules to govern
disputes subject to arbitration, even if the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") would
have preempted the rules contracted for in the agreement.33 In Volt, the parties
entered into an agreement for the installation of electrical conduits at Stanford
University in California.34 The agreement included an arbitration clause for "all
disputes . . . arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof' and a
choice of law provision stating, "[t]he Contract shall be governed by the law of
the place where the project is located."35 The Court found that the choice of law
provision incorporated the California Rules of Arbitration to govern every dispute
subject to arbitration, even though the dispute pertained to interstate commerce, an
area the FAA traditionally governed.3 The Court stated that although the FAA
30. Id.
31. "Arbitrability law" is a term of art used to refer to whether a dispute is subject to arbitration.
Whether a dispute is arbitrable may depend on national law establishing a court's jurisdiction over a
particular dispute and laws or rules relating to arbitration itself. Stavros Brekoulakis, Law Applicable
to Arbitrability: Revisiting the Revisited Lex Fori 101 (Queen Mary University of London, School of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 21/2009).
32. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
33. Id at 470.
34. Id
35. Id.
36. Id. at 472.
254 [Vol. 2013
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preempts conflicting state law, the FAA does not prevent the parties from agreeing
to arbitrate under rules that are different than those established in the FAA. 37 In
holding that California state arbitration law applied, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the importance of party autonomy in contracting for state arbitration law and
denied preclusive effect of the FAA where a contract states otherwise.38
Ultimately, the Court determined that choice of law provisions will be en-
forced in an agreement to arbitrate under non-federal rules of arbitration.39 The
Court also cited a key provision of the FAA which stated that "arbitration proceed
in the manner provided for in [the parties'] agreement." 40 Although parties may
not use state law to prevent enforceability of arbitration clauses, the Court recog-
nized that the FAA does not require parties to adhere to a specific set of rules
pertaining to arbitration.4' In recognizing the ability of parties to contract for state
rules of arbitration, the Supreme Court laid the groundwork to honor arbitration
agreements containing foreign rules of arbitration, as both state and foreign rules
of arbitration fall into the category of non-federal law. 42
In addition to the Supreme Court's recognition of parties' ability to contract
for state rules of arbitration in cases traditionally governed by the FAA, federal
circuits have also recognized the ability of the parties to use state or foreign law in
cases that are governed by the FAA.43  In Ford v. Nylcare Health Plans," the
Fifth Circuit considered whether the Texas General Arbitration Act governed the
arbitrability of the claim when the FAA also covered the scope of the arbitration
agreement. 45 The dispute in Ford arose out of a contract between a physician and
a Health Management Organization ("HMO"). 46 The physician agreed to provide
medical services to the HMO's patients, and in exchange, the HMO would com-
pensate the physician. 47 The agreement contained an arbitration clause stating that
"any claim must be settled 'in accordance with the Texas General Arbitration
Act."'48 The contract also stated that the "agreement [was] subject to arbitration
under the Texas General Arbitration Act." 49 When the physician brought a false
37. Id. at 479.
38. Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 479.
39. Id. at 472. The Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth also dealt
with the issue of arbitrability and foreign choice of law clauses. Mitsubishi Motor, 473 U.S. 614
(1985). Mitsubishi and Soler Chrysler-Plymouth entered into a car sales agreement with a clause
providing for disputes to be settled by arbitration in Japan using the rules set forth by the Japan Com-
mercial Arbitration Association. Id. at 617. The Court did not reach the issue of whether the parties
could contract to apply Japanese arbitration rules because the Court found that the anti-trust claims
were subject to arbitration under the American Arbitration Act. Id. at 627.
40. Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 474-75; 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
41. Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 476.
42. See generally, Ronald C. Peterson, International Arbitration Agreements in United States
Courts, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb. 2000, at 47.
43. See Ford v. Nylcare Health Plans, 141 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 1998); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan,
388 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2004); In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1981).
44. 141 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 1998).
45. Id. at 248.
46. Id. at 245.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 246.
49. Ford, 141 F.3d at 246.
No. I] 255
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advertising and deceptive practices claim against the HMO, the two parties disa-
greed over the arbitrability of the claims.50
The court held that the agreement, on its face, pointed to the Texas General
Arbitration Act as the choice of law for arbitration, including its scope.5 1 Given
the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that no other provision ex-
pressly stated that the arbitrability of the dispute would not be governed by Texas
law, and further that Texas law itself provided rules on the scope of arbitration
clauses, the court determined that Texas law governed the arbitrability of the
claim.52 After applying Texas law, the court found that the claims did not arise
out of the agreement, and therefore, the physician could proceed to litigate the
claims.5 3 The Fifth Circuit also pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in Volt,
noting that if the Supreme Court held that parties may agree to the rules of arbitra-
tion, parties may also choose the law that determines the scope of arbitration.54
The Second Circuit has also recognized that parties may contract to apply
foreign arbitrability law. In Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan,55 the Second Circuit
held that the dispute between Motorola and Uzan was not arbitrable under Swiss
law, which the parties had agreed to apply in a sales contract containing an arbi-
tration clause.56 Uzan, the defendant, argued that the FAA should be applied to
the dispute pertaining to misrepresentation and false claims of kidnapping.5 1 Uzan
relied solely on the notion that the FAA ensured uniform arbitrability law. 5  The
court rejected this argument, noting that if parties chose the law to govern the
arbitrability of the dispute, the choice would be honored to enforce the agreement
and avoid forum shopping.59
The Uzan court applied the Swiss choice of law clause to the arbitrability is-
sue, even though the clause did not specifically state that Swiss law determined
the scope of the arbitration clause. The court reasoned that because Swiss arbi-
tration law dictates that arbitration is only binding on parties bound by the con-
tractual agreement, the dispute was not arbitrable.6 ' The claims against Uzan
involved parties other than Motorola and Uzan, the only two parties who had en-
tered into the contractual agreement containing the Swiss choice of law clause. 62
The Second Circuit also cited the Supreme Court's decision in Volt where the
50. Id. The HMO wanted to arbitrate the claims, while the physician had organized a class action
against the HMO. Id.
51. Id. at 249.
52. Id. The scope of the arbitration agreement is another way of phrasing whether a dispute is sub-
ject to arbitration, or namely, the arbitrability of the dispute. Id.
53. Id. at 252.
54. Ford, 141 F.3d at 248 (citing Volt Info. Sys., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468,476 (1989)).
55. 388 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2004).
56. Id. at 65.
57. Id. at 44, 51.
58. Id. at 51.
59. Id. The court expressed concerns over forum shopping in choosing to override the choice of law
the parties agreed to have binding on the dispute. The court believed that choice of law clauses were
the only way to ensure uniform interpretation among two parties entering into an agreement, each from
different countries. Id
60. Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d at 50.
61. Id. at 51-52.
62. Id. at 52-53.
256 [Vol. 2013
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Court emphasized the importance of honoring a choice of law agreement.63 By
recognizing the parties' ability to contract for foreign arbitrability law, the Second
Circuit has also extended the Supreme Court's reasoning in Volt, where the Court
upheld state choice of law provisions in arbitration agreements.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has applied English
arbitrability law to a party's agreement to arbitrate under the rules of English sal-
vage law.6 In re Oil Spillinvolved a crude oil carrier owned by Amoco that suf-
fered a steering failure at sea. 65 The owner of a salvage tug, the Pacific, entered
into an agreement with Amoco to rescue the carrier, and thereafter attempted to
gain control of the carrier by attaching a tow line. 66 The Pacific's rescue attempt
proved unsuccessful when the carrier ran aground and split apart.6 7 Subsequently,
Amoco claimed negligence against Bugsier, the owner of the Pacific. 68 The court
resolved the dispute by mandating arbitration under the rules of English salvage
law, as stated inthe terms of the rescue agreement. 69 The agreement contained an
arbitration clause for "any difference arising out of this agreement" and included a
choice of law clause providing for English salvage law. 70 The agreement, howev-
er, did not specifically state that English salvage law governed the scope of the
arbitration clause.' The court reasoned that the claim alleged against Bugsier
pertained to the rescue attempt, which fell under the agreement and related to the
subject matter of the arbitration clause.72 Since English salvage law corresponded
to the disputes subject to arbitration, the parties proceeded to arbitration.
The Supreme Court has recognized the ability of parties to contract for state
rules of arbitration and federal circuit courts have recognized the ability of parties
to contract for both state and foreign arbitration law. The Supreme Court has not,
however, specifically recognized the ability of parties to contract for foreign arbi-
trability law.
B. Interpreting Whether Non-Federal Arbitrability Law Applies
Courts have recognized the ability of parties to contract for arbitration agree-
ments that apply state or foreign arbitration law during arbitration proceedings,
but in determining whether the choice of law applies to the arbitrability of the
dispute, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue. 74 Two cases
63. Id. at 51 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989)).
64. In re Oil Spill by the "Amoco Cadiz" Off the Coast of France March 16, 1978, 659 F.2d 789,
793-94 (7th Cir. 1981).




69. Id. at 795.
70. In re Oil Spill, 659 F.2d at 791-92.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 794.
73. Id. at 796.
74. Federal courts have addressed the issue. See Ford v. Nylcare Health Plans, 141 F.3d 243, 248
(5th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Texas arbitration choice of law clause determined that the parties
intended the state law to apply to the "scope of the arbitration."); but c.f Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc.
No. 1] 257
7
Sanocki: Sanocki: Determining Arbitrability of the Dispute
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
point to the reasoning that the Supreme Court could apply when the issue is
whether or not parties have adequately contracted to apply non-federal arbitrabil-
ity law.75 First, the Court has stated how other courts should interpret whether the
parties have agreed to arbitrate the question of arbitrability. 76 Second, the Court
has held that separate, general choice of law clausesn do not determine the appli-
cable arbitrability law.7  In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the Su-
preme Court applied principles of contract interpretation to determine whether an
arbitration clause is sufficient in scope to allow parties to arbitrate the question of
arbitrability. 0
In the dispute before the Court in Kaplan, Kaplan and First Options disagreed
over whether the arbitrator should determine the whether the dispute was arbitra-
ble.8 ' The arbitration agreement, silent on the issue, limited the claims subject to
arbitration. 82 In determining whether the arbitrator determined arbitrability, the
Court proceeded cautiously, noting that parties cannot be forced arbitrate issues
outside of the scope of the arbitration clause. The Court stated that subsequent
courts faced with the same issue should not interpret silence or ambiguity as dis-
positive of arbitrability.8 4 The Court noted that the effect would be to force parties
to arbitrate an issue that they may have thought a court-of law would decide, espe-
cially since the traditional role of the court included deciding the arbitrability of
the dispute, not an arbitrator.8 5 Further, the Court noted, no assumption should be
made that parties have agreed to arbitrate the question of arbitrability unless "clear
and unmistakable evidence" is present to show otherwise.8 6
The Court in Kaplan decided that silence or ambiguity in a general arbitration
agreement requires the interpreting court to adopt a presumption against arbitrat-
ing the question of arbitrability, as opposed to the usual presumption in favor of
arbitration.8 7 The Court reasoned that the presumption is against arbitrating the
question of arbitrability because the courts determine whether a dispute is subject
to arbitration or a court proceeding.88 "Clear and unmistakable evidence," howev-
er, can overcome the presumption.8 9 Because the Supreme Court has required
v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39 (3d Cit. 1978) (holding that general choice of law arbi-
tration clauses are not enough to override the application of federal arbitrability law).
75. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearman Leh-
man Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
76. See infra note 8 1.
77. Separate, general choice of law clauses are found in a contract that also contains an arbitration
clause. The issue is whether the separate, general choice of law clause is sufficient in determining the
choice of law to be used during arbitration and in determining the arbitrability of the dispute. See infra
note 83.
78. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1995).
79. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
80. Id. at 944.
81. Id. at 941. Whether the arbitrator would determine if the dispute is subject to arbitration is the
issue of arbitrating arbitrability. Id.
82. Id.at 946.
83. Id. at 945.
84. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 944.
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"clear and unmistakable evidence" that parties agreed to arbitrate the question of
arbitrability,90 the Supreme Court may require the same standard to be applied in
cases concerning whether or not foreign arbitrability law has been sufficiently
contracted for, especially given the presumptive role of federal arbitrability law.
The Supreme Court has also determined that including a general choice of
law clause within a contract will not determine the arbitrability law to be ap-
plied.91 A general choice of law clause in a contract is a clause separate from the
arbitration clause.92 The choice of law clause will broadly refer to a particular law
as governing the entire contract.9 3 The Supreme Court held in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.94 that federal courts should not read a general state
choice of law clause in a contract as applying the state's law of arbitrability. 95
The parties in Mastrobuono agreed to a securities trading contract that stated New
York law governed the entire agreement. 96 The agreement also contained an arbi-
tration clause, separate from the choice of law clause, providing that "any contro-
versy" was subject to arbitration. In considering the interplay of the two clauses,
the Court applied contract interpretation principles to reach its conclusion that
although New York law governed the contract, New York law did not determine
the arbitrability of punitive damages, the issue in dispute. Because the general
choice of law provision simply provided for New York law to govern disputes, the
Court refused to automatically deem the provision as dispositive of the issue of
arbitrability. 99
The Court reasoned that choice of law clauses pertain to legal rights and du-
ties the parties have agreed to, while the arbitration clause solely covers arbitra-
tion. 00 Noting that arbitrability of a dispute is a different legal concept than the
substantive law used to determine the outcome of the dispute, the Court refused to
apply New York law to determine arbitrability of the punitive damages issues.'0'
Because the choice of law clause did not contain an express exclusion of the puni-
tive damages issue from the scope of the arbitration clause, the court refused to
read the provision as narrowing the scope of arbitrable issues to those arbitrable
under New York law.102 Given the ambiguity in determining arbitrability, the
Court applied federal arbitrability law to determine the issues arbitrable under the
agreement. 0 3 Although the Supreme Court declined to extend general choice of
law clauses to determine the arbitrability law, the Mastrobuono decision leaves
open the possibility that arbitration clauses may specifically state the law to be
90. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45.
91. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1995).
92. For more information on choice of law clauses in contracts, see Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law
by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 282-83 (1993).
93. Id. at 246.
94. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
95. Id. at 63-64.
96. Id. at 58-59.
97. Id. at 59.
98. Id. .
99. Id. at 62.
100. Id. at 64.
101. Id. at 62, 64.
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used in determining the scope of arbitration.'04 Together, the Court's decision in
Kaplan and the Court's decision in Mastrobuono state that choice of law clauses
in arbitration agreements must clearly state the law to be applied and the context
in which the law will apply.'05
C. Application ofFederal Arbitrability Law
If parties have not contracted for non-federal arbitrability law, federal arbitra-
bility law applies to determine the scope of arbitration.' 0 6 Federal arbitrability law
is split on whether the scope of arbitration is governed by a broad or narrow inter-
pretation of the arbitration clause.' 0 7 The Ninth Circuit relies on a narrow inter-
pretation under common law principles of contract interpretation, as announced in
Mediterranean Enterprises.i0 8 The issue in Mediterranean Enterprises formed
from a construction contract containing an arbitration clause for "any dispute aris-
ing hereunder." 09 Mediterranean Enterprises contested the arbitration of issues
independent from the contract, including conversion, quantum meruit, and con-
spiring to induce breach of contract.110 The court found that the language of the
clause "arising hereunder" should be narrowly construed and applied only to dis-
putes "arising under the agreement.""' The court noted that if parties intend to
create a broad arbitration provision, the clause should include language similar to
"arising out of or relating to" the contract.' l2 Because of the narrow language
used in the contract, the court held that Mediterranean's claims were outside of the
contract and similarly were not arbitrable." 3
The Ninth Circuit stated in Tracer Research Corp. v. Environmental Services,
Co."l 4 that narrowly written arbitration clauses will preclude issues falling outside
of the scope of the clause from being subject to arbitration. The parties con-
tracted for a licensing and nondisclosure agreement, including a provision to arbi-
trate "any controversy or claim arising out of [this] Agreement." 116 Tracer alleged
a tort claim against Environmental Services for misappropriation of trade se-
crets." 7 The court held that the tort claim, independent from the breach of the
contract claim, could not be subject to arbitration under the scope of the agree-
104. See Ford, 141 F.3d at 26. The parties in Ford specifically stated that the "agreement is subject
to arbitration under the Texas General Arbitration Act." Id. The Ford case provides an example of an
agreement that states the law to be sued in determining the scope of arbitration. Id.
105. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62; Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944-45.
106. Doulgas H. Yam & Gregory Todd Jones, Applicable Arbitration Law, Ga. ADR Prac. & Proc. §
9:11 (3d ed).
107. See Mediterranean Enterprises v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir. 1983) (inter-
preting the scope of the arbitration agreement narrowly); but cf Gregory v. Electro-Mechanical Corp.,
83 F.3d 382, 386 (11 th Cir. 1996) (interpreting the scope of the arbitration agreement broadly).
108. Mediterranean Enterprises v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983); see also
Tracer Research Corp. v. National Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1994).
109. Mediterranean Enterprises v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1460-61 (9th Cir. 1983).
110. Id. at 1461.
111. Id. at 1463-64.
112. Id. at 1464.
113. Id. at 1465.
114. 42 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1994).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1293, 1295.
117. Id. at 1294.
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ment."1 The court also rejected the argument that the claim would not have oc-
curred but for the parties' licensing agreement.119 The court concluded that the
parties had written the arbitration clause to narrowly include only those issues
under the contract.120
Other circuits have disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of
arbitration agreements using the "arising out of' language in favor of the federal
presumption toward arbitration.121  The Sixth Circuit has held that arbitration
clauses requiring "any dispute arising out of' the agreement is subject to a broad
interpretation, given the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.122 In High-
lands Wellmont Health Network,123 the dispute occurred over whether a fraudulent
inducement claim related to the contract as whole, such that the dispute would be
subject to the arbitration clause.124 Wellmont, a health management organization
subject to the claim, argued that the claim related to but did not arise out of the
contract, and therefore, a narrow interpretation would require that the claim be
resolved in court.125 The court held that because there was a strong presumption
toward arbitration and that a broad interpretation of the clause dictates that every-
thing is subject to arbitration unless otherwise stated, the fraudulent inducement
claim was subject to arbitration.126
The Eleventh Circuit has also rejected a narrow interpretation of arbitration
clauses using the "arising hereunder" language because doubts about the scope of
arbitration are said to be resolved in favor of the issue subjected to arbitration.127
The dispute in Gregory v. Electro-Mechanical Corp.128 occurred over whether tort
claims arising from the agreement entered into were subject to the agreement's
"arising hereunder" arbitration clause.129 The court looked at the facts alleged in
the complaint rather than the legal claims asserted to determine that the claims
arose under the agreement.130 The Eleventh Circuit, unlike the Ninth Circuit,
adheres to a broad interpretation of arbitration agreements containing the "arising
hereunder" or "arising under" language.' 3'
The Second Circuit, which previously adopted a narrow scope of arbitration
agreements using the "arising under" language,132 is shifting toward a broader
interpretation of similar language because of the federal policy favor of arbitra-
118. Id. at 1295.
119. Id
120. Id
121. See Highlands Wellmont Health Network v. John Deere Health Plan, 350 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir.
2003); Gregory v. Electro-Mechanical Corp., 83 F.3d 382, 386 (11th Cir. 1996).
122. Highlands Wellmont Health Network v. John Deere Health Plan, 350 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir.
2003). In Volt, the Supreme Court announced a federal policy in favor of arbitration. 489 U.S. 468,
475 (1989).
123. 350 F.3d at 575.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 576.
126. Id. at 577-78.
127. See Gregory v. Electro-Mechanical Corp., 83 F.3d 382, 386 (11th Cir. 1996).
128. 83 F.3d 382 (11 th Cir. 1996).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 384.
131. Id.
132. See In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding a fraudulent inducement
claim not arbitrable because the arbitration clause did not include broad language such as "relating to
this contract" or "in connection with" the contract.)
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tion.133 Under its broad interpretation of arbitration clauses, the Second Circuit
has recognized that all issues fall within the scope of arbitration unless the clause
expressly states otherwise.134 In Ace Capital, a dispute arose over whether a
fraudulent inducement claim pertaining to a reinsurance contract was subject to
arbitration when the scope of the arbitration clause limited arbitrable disputes to
those under the reinsurance agreement. 135  The court held that the arbitration
clause, which required arbitration of any dispute within the agreement, included
the fraudulent inducement claim.136 The court saw the arbitration clause as writ-
ten broadly and without any limitation on the scope of the issues subject to arbitra-
tion.137 The Second Circuit, in recognizing the growing federal policy toward
arbitration, has broadly construed "arising under" language to favor arbitration.'38
The Ninth Circuit has also begun a shift from precedent in favor of a narrow
construction toward a broader construction of arbitration agreements. In Simula,
Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc.,1 the court held that arbitration clauses using the language
"arising in connection with this agreement" were to be construed broadly and in
favor of arbitrating all disputes related to the contract. 140 Like other circuits, the
Ninth Circuit cited the increasing importance of the federal policy in favor of
arbitration.141 To date, Simula is the only case to veer from the circuit's precedent
establishing a narrow construction of arbitration agreements.142
Although the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have not determined
whether or not parties may contract to apply foreign arbitrability law, and further
what standard would determine whether non-federal arbitrability law has been
contracted for, several decisions have provided guidance on the issue. First, the
Supreme Court has recognized that parties may contract to apply state rules of
arbitration, even when the FAA governs the dispute.143 Other federal circuits have
recognized the parties' ability to agree to apply state or foreign rules of arbitration,
including arbitrability law.'" This recognition does not rule out the possibility
that parties may contract to apply foreign arbitrability law. Second, the Supreme
Court held that parties must clearly and unmistakably state in an agreement to
arbitrate that the arbitrator determines arbitrability, as silence on the issue is not
enough.14 5 The Court has also held that general choice of law clauses do not de-
termine the arbitrability law to be applied.146 Together, these two decisions imply
133. See Ace Capital Re Overseas Ltd. v. Central United Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir.
2002).
134. Id. at 29.
135. Id. at 26.
136. Id. at 34-35. See also Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (holding that a
fraudulent inducement claim related to an agreement is generally covered by an arbitration clause
using the language "arising out of or relating to this agreement.").
137. Ace Capital Re Overseas Ltd., 307 F.3d at 34-35.
138. Id. at 33.
139. 175 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 1999).
140. Id. at 718.
141. Id. at 719.
142. See Mediterranean Enterprises, 708 F.2d at 1461; Tracer Research Corp., 42 F.3d 1292.
143. See supra note 39.
144. Dr. Kenneth Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 141 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir.
1998).
145. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995).
146. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995).
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that parties wishing to apply non-federal arbitrability law must clearly state the
applicable law.
Finally, if parties have not contracted for non-federal arbitrability law, federal
arbitrability law is split on whether the scope of arbitration is governed by a broad
or narrow interpretation of the arbitration clause.14 7 Until Cape Flattery, the issue
of contracting to apply foreign arbitrability law seemed unclear; however, in its
holding, the court announced principles of contract interpretation in reliance on
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in similar cases and on Ninth Circuit prece-
dent. 148
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Cape Flattery Ltd v. Titan Maritime, LLC, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and held that when
parties entered into a written contract agreeing arbitrability would be governed by
non-federal arbitrability law, courts should enforce the agreement as written only
if there is "clear and unmistakable evidence" the contracting parties intended to
use non-federal law.149 Because the agreement entered into between Cape Flattery
and Titan Maritime established that English arbitration law applied but did not
present "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the parties intended to use English
arbitrability law, federal arbitrability law applied.150 The court further held that
federal arbitrability law construed the agreement's "any dispute arising under"
arbitration clause narrowly and not inclusive of the tort claim brought by Cape
Flattery.15 ' The Ninth Circuit began by addressing the dispositive issue of wheth-
er parties can contract to apply foreign arbitrability law.1 52 If the parties could not
do so, then the case would be resolved by federal arbitrability law, while if the
parties could do so, the issue would require further analysis.
In concluding that courts should enforce a foreign arbitrability clause that par-
ties have expressly provided for in a contract, the Cape Flattery court relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information Science, Inc. v. Board of Trus-
tees. 154 The court pointed to the Supreme Court's emphasis on the fact that the
FAA does not require a particular set of rules to be used for arbitration. 5s In Volt,
the Supreme Court held that parties could contract to apply the California Arbitra-
tion Act, a state law. 156 Titan Maritime's argument guided the court in adopting
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Volt.157 Titan Maritime argued that if the Su-
preme Court enforced parties' agreements to use non-federal rules of arbitration,
147. See supra note 109.
148. Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2011).
149. Id. at 924.
150. Id. at 921.
151. Id
152. Id at 918.
153. Id
154. Id. at 919.
155. Id.
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then so too should the Ninth Circuit enforce the parties' agreements to use non-
federal arbitrability law.'58
In response to Titan Maritime's argument, Cape Flattery Ltd. raised the ar-
gument applied in Mitsubishi Motors.'9 Although the Cape Flattery court recog-
nized the case, the court ultimately dismissed the reasoning as applied to this is-
sue.160 Neither party in the Mitsubishi case argued that Japanese arbitration law
applied to determine arbitrability.' 6 ' Thus, the court never addressed the issue of
whether parties may agree to apply foreign arbitrability law.162 The court also
pointed to language in Volt, stating that a private agreement to arbitrate should be
enforced according to its terms. 63 This language suggested to the Cape Flattery
court that foreign arbitrability law may be contracted for in an agreement to arbi-
trate.'6
Because parties may agree to have arbitrability governed by foreign arbitra-
bility law, the court then grappled with the more complex question of how to de-
cide whether the parties had sufficiently contracted to apply foreign arbitrability
law.'65  The Supreme Court's reasoning in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, where the court held that "clear and unmistakable evidence" is required to
show that parties intended to arbitrate the question of arbitrability, guided the
Cape Flattery court's decision in interpreting the contract. 166  Cape Flattery
pointed to the principle of contract interpretation pronounced by the Supreme
Court that no assumption should be made about arbitrating the question of arbitra-
bility unless it is clear that the parties intended to submit the issue of arbitrability
to the arbitrator. 67
The Cape Flattery court also recognized that other courts have resolved simi-
lar issues related to arbitrability by adopting a "standard contractual analysis" and
not a heightened burden as in Kaplan.16 The court pointed to other decisions,
which have stated that general choice of law clauses are separate from arbitration
clauses, and thus not relevant in determining arbitrability law.'69 Courts that have
recognized general choice of law clauses as separate from arbitration clauses have
stated that the separate clauses are not enough to overcome "the overriding basis
the FAA creates for applying federal arbitrability law."' 70
After examining the different approaches in interpreting whether parties have
agreed to a choice of law for arbitrability of the dispute, the Cape Flattery court
rested its decision on the reasoning of Kaplan.'7 ' First, the court agreed with the
158. Id.
159. Cape Flattery, 647 F.3d at 918-19. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 1985) (holding that federal arbitrability law applied even though the parties' agree-
ment stated that Japanese arbitration law governed the dispute's arbitrability).





165. Cape Flattery, 647 F.3d at 919-920.
166. Id. at 920.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Cape Flattery, 647 F.3d at 920; see; (S.D. Cal. 2000);.
170. Cape Flattery, 647 F.3d at 920-21 (citing (S.D. Cal. 2000)).
171. Cape Flattery Ltd, 647 F.3d at 921.
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Supreme Court's concern that a general agreement does not specifically state the
parties' true intent on a silent issue.' 72 Second, the court analogized the issue in
Kaplan ("who should decide arbitrability") with the present issue of "what law
governs arbitrability?" 73 The court found the issue in Kaplan to be sufficiently
similar to the present issue.174 Consequently, the court stated that silence or ambi-
guity may not be construed to apply non-federal arbitrability law.'75 Otherwise,
parties may be required to use foreign arbitrability law when they intended for
federal arbitrability law to apply.'76 Following Kaplan, the court stated that with-
out "clear and unmistakable evidence" to the contrary, courts should apply federal
arbitrability law.'77
The court next examined the agreement between Cape Flattery and Titan
Maritime to see if the parties had in fact agreed to apply English arbitrability
law. 78 The court found that the agreement did not state whether English arbitra-
bility law applied. 179 The agreement referenced the English Arbitration Act, but
the language did not provide "clear and unmistakable evidence" that English law
also decided arbitrability of the tort claim against Titan Maritime. 18o As a result,
the court applied federal arbitrability law to determine whether the case was sub-
ject to arbitration.' 8'
The final question the court had to resolve pertained to the application of fed-
eral arbitrability law to the gross negligence claim filed against Titan Maritime.' 82
The court relied on its own precedent in Mediterranean and Tracer.183 In those
cases, the Ninth Circuit held that using language such as "arising hereunder" or
"any controversy or claim arising out of this Agreement" established a narrow
interpretation of the arbitration agreement.184 The Cape Flattery court concluded
that the language used in the Mediterranean and Tracer cases was the same or
similar to the language used in the agreement between Cape Flattery and Titan
Maritime.' 85 As a result, a narrow interpretation of the arbitration clause would
determine its scope. 86 The court rejected Titan Maritime's argument that the
presumption in favor of arbitration should override the Mediterranean and Tracer
line of reasoning because the policy came about after Mediterranean and Trac-
er.'87 The adoption of a new federal policy is not an adequate basis, the court












183. Id at 922.
184. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 921 (citing Mediterranean Enterprises v. Ssangyong Corp., 708
F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1983); Tracer Research Corp. v. Nat'l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir.
1994)).
185. Cape Flattery Ltd, 647 F.3d at 922.
186. Id
187. Id at 922-923.
188. Id. at 923.
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Titan Maritime also argued that a narrow interpretation of the agreement
should be rejected because other circuits have construed the same language broad-
ly.'"9 The Cape Flattery court rejected this argument as well, noting that the
Ninth Circuit's own precedent established in Mediterranean and Tracer is a far
more convincing precedent to follow than out-of-circuit cases. 190 Titan Maritime
also argued that the Ninth Circuit has restricted the importance of Mediterranean
and Tracer.191 The court stated that although the application of Mediterranean
and Tracer is limited by the specific language in the agreement at issue, the cases
should still be followed.1 92
Finally, in applying Mediterranean and Tracer, the court held that Cape Flat-
tery could pursue the gross negligence claim filed against Titan Maritime in
court. 9 3 The court pointed to the fact that a federal statute granted Cape Flattery
authority to bring a civil action against any person responsible for damage under
the statute.194 Under the narrow interpretation of "arising under," the present dis-
pute did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause, and therefore the claim
was not subject to arbitration.195 Accordingly, the decision of the District Court of
Hawaii was affirmed. 9 6
V. COMMENT
The issues pertaining to arbitrability and choice of law had not been previous-
ly addressed by either the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit. These specific
issues presented a challenge to the court in determining the appropriate applica-
tion of foreign arbitrability law. In concluding that parties could contract to apply
foreign arbitrability law, the court stood directly with the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Volt.197 There, the Supreme Court upheld party autonomy when it stated
that the FAA permits parties to contract for and use state arbitration rules, even
when the dispute is within the purview of the FAA.' 98 The Volt decision laid the
groundwork for the Cape Flattery court to recognize that parties may also contract
to use foreign arbitrability law to determine the disputes subject to arbitration.19
In determining the application of foreign arbitrability law, the Ninth Circuit creat-
ed a new standard for drafting arbitration clauses.200 This section will first exam-
ine the "clear and unmistakable" standard announced by the court and then will





193. Id at 924.
194. Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012).
195. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 924.
196. Id
197. Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S.
468 (1989).
198. Id.
199. Volt, 489 U.S. 468; International Arbitration Agreements in United States Courts, DISP. RESOL.
J., Feb. 2000, at 44, 49.
200. Cape Flattery Lid., 647 F.3d at 921.
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A. The "Clear and Unmistakable" Standard
The Ninth Circuit properly extracted the Kaplan "clear and unmistakable
standard" to determine whether the parties had sufficiently contracted to apply
foreign arbitrability law in all disputes arising under the contract. The court con-
cluded that although Cape Flattery and Titan Maritime expressly agreed to arbi-
trate disputes under English arbitration law, the parties had not sufficiently con-
tracted to include English arbitrability law to govern whether the dispute was arbi-
trable.201 Instead, the Ninth Circuit relied on federal arbitrability law because
there was no "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the parties intended to apply
English arbitrability law. 202 The Ninth Circuit adopted the "clear and unmistaka-
ble" standard by following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Kaplan, where
the court held that parties would be subject to arbitrating arbitrability if there was
"clear and unmistakable" evidence that the parties wanted an arbitrator to decide
whether a dispute was subject to arbitration.203
In following the reasoning of Kaplan, the Ninth Circuit analogized the dis-
pute before the court-whether the parties had contracted to apply English arbi-
trability law-with the issue before the Supreme Court in Kaplan-whether the
parties had agreed to subject the arbitrability determination to an arbitrator. 204 The
Cape Flattery court properly extracted and applied the standard from Kaplan,
which, according to Steven H. Reisberg, has been misapplied to arbitration juris-
prudence.205
Reisberg asserted that the holding in Kaplan applied the "clear and unmistak-
able" standard to agreements where the issue was whether parties had contracted
for the arbitrator to determine arbitrability, or generally, where the scope of arbi-
tration was at issue.206 However, courts have applied the standard to arbitrability
in a different sense, namely to disputes over whether an arbitration agreement was
valid and enforceable.207 In situations involving the validity of the arbitration
agreement, courts misapply the Kaplan standard by allowing the issue to be re-
solved by arbitrators when there is "clear and unmistakable evidence" the parties
wanted the arbitrator to decide if the agreement was valid.208 A proper Kaplan
analysis, according to Reisberg, requires the court to validate the enforceability of
the arbitration agreement, and then determine whether "clear and unmistakable
evidence" exists to show that the parties wanted the arbitrator, not the court, to
determine arbitrability of the claim.209 In short, a proper Kaplan analysis applies
the "clear and unmistakable standard" to the scope of a valid arbitration agree-




204. Id,; Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944.
205. Steven H. Reisberg, The Rules Governing Who Decides Jurisdictional Issues: First Options v.
Kaplan Revisited, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 159 (2009).
206. Id at 176, 178.
207. Id. at 180-181.
208. Id.
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The Cape Flattery court did not misapply the Kaplan analysis in announcing
a new principle of arbitration jurisprudence; rather, the court used the standard to
state how choice of law determined the scope of the arbitration agreement. 2 11 By
adopting the "clear and unmistakable" standard, parties will be able to draft arbi-
tration agreements that resolve the issue of choice of law in arbitrability. If the
arbitrability issue has not been clearly stated within an arbitration clause, parties
may also rely on a court to interpret the choice of law as applicable only to arbitra-
tion, not to arbitrability. The Cape Flattery court's holding that parties may con-
tract to apply non-federal arbitrability law with "clear and unmistakable" evidence
allows for greater predictability in resolving potential disputes and reorients future
Kaplan analyses toward the general rule of law established: "clear and unmistaka-
ble" evidence determines the scope of a valid arbitration agreement.
B. Interpretation ofArbitration Clauses
The Ninth Circuit's decision to preserve a narrow interpretation of arbitration
agreements using "arising under" language maintains uniformity of the law and
well-known drafting principles for arbitration agreements. After concluding that
Cape Flattery and Titan Maritime had not sufficiently contracted to apply English
arbitrability law, the court had to interpret the arbitration clause to determine
whether federal arbitrability law required that the claim proceed to arbitration. 212
The gross negligence claim, the Ninth Circuit stated, was not subject to arbitration
because of the contractual language used to describe the arbitrable disputes. 213
Titan Maritime and Cape Flattery agreed to arbitrate any dispute "arising under"
214the agreement2. This, the court stated, meant that a narrow interpretation ap-
plied, as established by Ninth Circuit precedent in Mediterranean and Tracer.215
The Cape Flattery court could have decided to follow the growing trend of
several other federal circuits, which hold that arbitration clauses should be con-
strued broadly in favor of the presumption toward arbitration. 216 A broad interpre-
tation of an arbitration clause means that the court will order arbitration of the
dispute even if the clause is unclear on whether the dispute is subject to arbitra-
tion, and only clear language stating that the particular dispute is excluded from
arbitration will make the claim non-arbitrable. 217 Even more recently, the Ninth
Circuit eroded the narrow construction doctrine in favor of a broader interpreta-
tion of the arbitration clause.21 8 The Cape Flattery court recognized that the
growing presumption in favor of arbitration had arisen since the narrow construc-
211. Cape Flattery Lid, 647 F.3d at 921.




216. Id; but see Highlands Wellmont Health Network v. John Deere Health Plan, 350 F.3d 568, 578
(6th Cir. 2003); Gregory v. Electro-Mechanical Corp., 83 F.3d 382, 386 (1 Ith Cir. 1996). See general-
ly Michael A. Hanzrman, Arbitration Agreements: Analyzing Threshold Choice of Law and Arbitrabil-
ity Questions: An Often Overlooked Task, FLA. B.J., Dec.1996, at 14, 22.
217. Hanzman, supra note 219.
218. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc. 175 F.3d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1999). See also I Litigation of Interna-
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tion precedent was established in Mediterranean and Tracer, but the court de-
clined to disregard the precedent because of a new federal policy. 219
Doak Bishop, based upon the narrow interpretation followed by the Ninth
Circuit in Mediterranean, advised parties who are drafting or negotiating an arbi-
tration agreement to consider the disputes they want subjected to arbitration and
subjected to litigation.220 To restrict the arbitrable issues to mere contractual dis-
putes, a narrow arbitration clause is required; while keeping all potential issues
within the realm of arbitration, including tort and statutory claims, requires a
broad-form clause.221 Bishop suggests "arising under" should be used for a nar-
row agreement, and "all disputes arising out of' should be used for a broad arbi-
222tration agreement. Michael Hanzman recommends that arbitration provisions
should be drafted to clearly state that parties have chosen to arbitrate all claims
arising from the contract or only claims referring to the contract. 223 Although the
Ninth Circuit refused to apply a broader interpretation of the arbitration clause to
support the growing federal policy in favor of arbitration, the court maintained
uniformity of the law by preserving the well-known drafting principles for arbitra-
224tion agreements. The Cape Flattery court has preserved the rule that "arising
under" language will cause the provision to be construed narrowly, resulting in
claims within the contract not subject to arbitration; whereas "arising out of' lan-
guage will construe the clause broadly, ultimately resulting in almost all claims
subject to arbitration.225
When future disputes arise, both parties and courts can rely on precedent to
guide the resolution of the dispute. The decision to apply a narrow construction of
the clause fits well with the court's view that federal arbitrability law applies un-
less "clear and unmistakable" evidence stated otherwise.226 When taken together,
a narrow interpretation of "arising under" language and the principle that parties
must state the arbitrability law to be used if intending non-federal law, parties will
be able to determine, beforehand, whether a dispute is subject to arbitration or a
court proceeding. Additionally, parties will be able to determine the applicable
law in each stage of the proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Cape Flattery decision reflects the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Volt, which recognized that parties may contract to apply state rules of arbitration
even when the FAA governs, 227 but goes one step further and extends the principle
219. Cape Flattery Ltd., 647 F.3d at 923.
220. Doak Bishop, Drafting Arbitration Agreements in the International Arena, 25 THE ADVOC.
(Texas) 32, 34 (2003) (citing Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458,
1464-65 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951, 952 (2d Cir. 1961)).
221. Doak Bishop, Drafting Arbitration Agreements in the International Arena, 25 The Advoc. (Tex-
as) 32, 34 (2003).
222. Id.
223. Michael A. Hanzman, supra note 219, at 14, 22.
224. Id.
225. Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2011).
226. Id. at 921.
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to foreign arbitrability law. The Ninth Circuit did not, however, provide carte
blanche to parties seeking to contract out of the federal forum entirely. The "clear
and unmistakable" standard must be applied to determine whether parties have in
fact applied non-federal arbitrability law to scope of the arbitration agreement.
This heightened burden requires parties to explicitly state the arbitrability law to
be used in an agreement to arbitrate, or else federal arbitrability law applies.
Ultimately, the "clear and unmistakable" standard established by the Ninth
Circuit will signal to parties drafting arbitration agreements that merely identify-
ing the choice of law for an arbitration proceeding will not establish the arbitrabil-
ity law to be applied to the dispute. The Ninth Circuit's adherence to a narrow
interpretation of arbitration agreements under federal arbitrability law will guide
parties in drafting future agreements. Parties seeking to arbitrate all claims must
include a broad-form arbitration clause, while parties seeking to arbitrate claims
under the contract only must include a narrow-form arbitration clause. The Cape
Flattery decision adds to arbitration jurisprudence by providing the clear and un-
mistakable standard for choice of arbitrability law in arbitration agreements.
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